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Abstract
We study the macroprudential roles of bank capital regulation and monetary pol-
icy in a borrowing cost channel model with endogenous nancial frictions, driven by
credit risk, bank losses and bank capital costs. These frictions induce nancial accel-
erator mechanisms and motivate the examination of a macroprudential toolkit. Fol-
lowing credit shocks, countercyclical regulation is more e¤ective than monetary policy
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nancial and macroeconomic stability. For supply shocks, combin-
ing macroprudential regulation with a stronger anti-inationary policy stance is opti-
mal. The ndings emphasize the importance of the Basel III accords in alleviating the
output-ination trade-o¤ faced by central banks, and cast doubt on the desirability of
conventional (and unconventional) Taylor rules during periods of nancial distress.
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1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis of 2007-2009 followed by the Great Recession have emphasized the impor-
tance of developing macroeconomic models studying the interactions between the nancial system
and real economy. In the aftermath of the crisis, it is now clear that restrictions in lending, higher
borrowing costs and nancial regulation, all of which directly impact the credit markets, have trans-
lated into distortions in the wider economy. Subsequently, a growing number of research papers
and policy discussions on the role of banking, credit risk and bank capital in the transmission of
demand, supply and importantly nancial shocks to the real economy have emerged in the past
few years.1
The general consensus in the literature is that credit market frictions and risk sensitive bank
capital regulation (in the form of Basel II) can exacerbate procyclicality in the nancial system and
real economy (see Covas and Fujita (2010), Liu and Seeiso (2012) and Angeloni and Faia (2013)
for Basel II procyclicality). These potential adverse consequences have led to a substantial shift in
the policy debate, which now not only focuses on the banksindividual solvency captured by bank
adequacy requirements (microprudential policies), but also on the role of macroprudential tools in
preventing and managing the build-up of nancial imbalances. The new Basel III Accords, set to
be fully implemented by 2018, intend to enforce banks to increase the quality of their assets, raise
the capital adequacy ratio, hold countercyclical bank capital bu¤ers and set loan loss provisions
in a timely manner before credit risk materializes (see Basel Committee of Banking Supervision
(BCBS) (2011) for further details). The objectives of the Basel III regulatory measures are to
enhance nancial stability, encourage more restricted lending in economic booms, mitigate systemic
risk and allow the nancial sector to better absorb losses associated with an eruption of a negative
credit cycle.
Beyond the direct reforms Basel III imposes on the global banking system, can countercyclical
bank capital bu¤ers, which rise during economic upturns and thus limit credit growth, also promote
overall macroeconomic and price stability? While these objectives are not o¢ cially part of the
banking regulation agenda (as opposed to protecting the banking sector against future losses),
it is clear that with the undeniable link between the nancial sector and real economy, banking
regulation may have also sizeable macroeconomic e¤ects. The question addressed is whether Basel
III-type regulation can contain the negative adverse spillovers owing from the nancial sector
to the real economy? In this context, we also need to comprehend the e¤ectiveness of monetary
policy rules in achieving price and output stability when credit market frictions and regulatory
requirements prevail.
This paper contributes to the growing macronance literature by promoting a further under-
standing on nancial-real sector linkages, and examining the welfare implications and interactions
between bank capital regulation and monetary policy in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model with nominal rigidities, a borrowing cost channel and endogenous nancial frictions.
These market imperfections include collateralized lending, nancial regulation, risk of default at
the rm level, and ex-ante commercial bank losses.2 The necessity for Basel II type bank capital
adequacy requirements is to absorb banking sector losses, which guarantees deposits are repaid in
1Meh and Moran (2010) and Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010) examine the role of bank capital in propa-
gating various shocks. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014), on the other hand,
focus on the direct e¤ects nancial shocks have on the macroeconomy. These authors nd that di¤erent types of
nancial shocks are important for explaining the dynamics of real variables.
2We use bank losses and default costs in the banking sector interchangeably throughout the paper.
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full. At the same time, credit risk induces further bank capital losses, resulting in an increase in
the cost of bank capital as well as stricter regulatory requirements (under Basel II), both of which
lead to higher borrowing costs. As in Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and De Fiore and Tristani (2013),
rms in this setup must borrow from commercial banks to nance their labour costs. Therefore, the
renance rate, bank capital regulation and the various credit market frictions described above (all
of which endogenously impact the lending rate and nancial market conditions) translate also into
changes in the behaviour of the marginal cost, price ination, wage ination and output through
the borrowing cost channel.3 Building on this literature, the borrowing cost channel in our model
is enhanced by a richer banking environment, regulatory requirements and various credit frictions,
which can explain important links between the nancial sector, ination and the real business
cycle.4
Compared to the majority of the macronance literature, where credit lines are used to nance
house purchase and investment in physical capital, we pursue a di¤erent approach and indeed
introduce loans to nance labour costs. This modeling viewpoint is motivated by recent evidence
which suggests that variations in working-capital loans following adverse nancial shocks can have
persistent negative e¤ects on the economic activity (see Fernandez-Corugedo, McMahon, Millard
and Rachel (2011) who estimate the cost channel for the U.K. economy and Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Trabandt (2015) who estimate this channel for the U.S.). This result, therefore, requires
the examination of macroprudential policies when rms rely on external nance to support their
production activities.
The simulated model shows that countercyclical nancial regulation (Basel III) is very e¤ective
at fostering nancial and price stability, whereas credit spread-augmented Taylor rules increase price
and wage ination volatilities, and thus provide zero welfare gains. From a policy perspective we
conclude that: a) If the economy is hit by credit shocks, then by setting bank capital requirements
responding countercyclically to credit risk, regulatory authorities can achieve the anti-ination tar-
get of monetary policy as well as eliminate welfare losses (comprised of variances in price ination,
the output gap and the wage ination gap). In this state, the output-price ination-wage ination
trade-o¤ is minimized and monetary policy rules become redundant since optimal monetary policy
suggests leaving the renance rate unchanged; b) Following technology shocks, aggressive macro-
prudential regulation can restore a more hawkish stance of monetary policy, which in combination
yield the highest welfare gain. Under these conditions, central banks can contribute further to price
stability through the standard demand channel of monetary policy without amplifying inationary
pressures via the monetary policy cost channel. Financial distortions, countercyclical regulation
and di¤erent types of shocks therefore signicantly alter the transmission mechanism of monetary
3 Indeed, we refer to this channel as the borrowing cost channeland not the standard cost channel of monetary
transmission as is common in this literature. The cost channel of monetary policy, a¤ected by changes in the
policy rate, is only part of the wider borrowing cost channel, which in our model is driven mostly by regulatory
requirements and credit market frictions.
4 In a recent contribution which abstracts from credit default risk, De Paoli and Paustian (2013) also use the
borrowing cost channel (loans for working-capital needs) to study the optimal interaction between macroprudential
regulation (dened by a cyclical tax on the borrowing of rms) and monetary policy under discretion and commit-
ment. We instead focus on optimal simple implementable rules, with monetary policy dened by a Taylor rule, and
macroprudential regulation operated through countercyclical bank capital requirements. See also Agénor and Pereira
da Silva (2014) who examine the interaction between macroprudential policy (in the form of cyclical required reserves)
and monetary policy within a simple deterministic macro model featuring a cost channel.
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policy and its optimal behaviour.
This paper is also related to the following strands of literature. First, it contributes to Agénor
and Aizenman (1998) and its New Keynesian counterpart framework developed in Agénor, Brat-
siotis and Pfajfar (2014), by introducing a rationale for bank capital (and explicitly modeling its
costs), ex-ante default costs in the banking sector, nancial risk shocks originating in the banking
system, countercyclical bank capital regulation and a credit spread-augmented type monetary pol-
icy rule. More specically, we evaluate optimal macroprudential and monetary policy rules in a
simple framework capable of generating a negative relationship between the loan rate spread and
GDP, without relying on the costly state verication mechanism and borrowersnet worth used in
the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) nancial accelerator type models.5 In fact, the addi-
tional nancial imperfections and Basel II type regulatory rules introduced in our model amplify
the countercyclical correlation between output and borrowing costs, and induce further nancial
accelerator e¤ects via the borrowing cost channel. The relatively small scale nature of our setup
also allows us to clearly disentangle and intuitively demonstrate the di¤erent transmission mecha-
nisms linking the credit market conditions to the macroeconomy, and to explain the implications
for optimal simple policy rules and welfare.
Second, this paper relates to recent contributions that have studied the interaction between
macroprudential regulation and monetary policy in macroeconomic models. For example, in a sim-
ple monetary model with nancial elements, NDiaye (2009) shows that countercyclical regulation
can support monetary policy in mitigating output uctuations while maintaining nancial stabil-
ity. In some DSGE contributions, Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012), Angelini, Neri and Panetta
(2014), Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and Angeloni and Faia (2013) illustrate that depending
on the nature of the shock, a combination of a credit-augmented Taylor rule together with a Basel
III type countercyclical rule, may be optimal in minimizing welfare losses. Moreover, Suh (2014)
demonstrates that macroprudential policy a¤ecting directly the nancial market conditions has a
limited impact on prices as opposed to monetary policy. Contributing to these models, we employ
a rich borrowing cost channel with endogenous credit spreads, which highlights the importance of
Basel III in promoting nancial, price and macroeconomic stability, as well as the welfare detri-
mental aspects of conventional and unconventional monetary policy rules. In this sense, our model
supports the more conventionalview, wherein monetary policy should not lean against the credit
cycleor respond to nancial imbalances (as also advocated in the seminal paper of Bernanke and
Gertler (2001)). Nevertheless, within this borrowing cost channel framework featuring endogenous
credit risk, as opposed to models where non-risky loans are provided to nance house purchases
(Gelain, Lansing and Mendicino (2013), and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016)), macroprudential
regulation considerably alleviates the standard trade-o¤s faced by central banks.6 In other words,
optimal banking regulation needs not to be in conict with monetary policy when the goal is to
achieve nancial, output and price stability. This result is a key di¤erence between our paper and
the ones described above, and highlights how a well-designed countercyclical rule can insulate the
5Most empirical evidence show a strong negative relationship between loan rate spreads and GDP uctuations
(see Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) and Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010) for example).
6Welfare in our model is based on an analytical second order approximation of the representative households
utility function such that central bank losses consist of price ination, output gap and wage ination volatilities. In
other words, nancial stability objectives do not directly enter the welfare function which excludes entrepreneurs and
the commercial banks utilities. Nevertheless, nancial frictions have a signicant impact on the real and nominal
variables so a macroprudential type regulatory policy targeting nancial stability (measured in terms of credit risk
and credit spreads in this model) can essentially achieve superior welfare outcomes.
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real economy from the adverse spillovers owing from the nancial sector, especially following more
empirically-relevant nancial shocks.7
Third, following nancial shocks, driven by uncertainty about the banks ability to recover
collateral from defaulting rms, we obtain a signicant trade-o¤ between output and ination,
supporting De Fiore and Tristani (2013) and Gilchrist, Schoenle, Sim and Zakrajsek (2016). In
the latter, nancially weak rms are more likely to increase prices during a crisis period in an
attempt to maintain cash ows, leading to a rise in aggregate ination and violating the so called
divine coincidenceof monetary policy.8 In the borrowing cost channel framework of De Fiore and
Tristani (2013), an aggressive easing of monetary policy (under commitment) is optimal in response
to adverse nancial shocks. Unlike their model, we generate a countercyclical loan rate spread
regardless of the type of shock (more consistent with the data as explained above). Additionally,
instead of characterizing a fully optimal (Ramsey) monetary policy, we study how credit market
frictions and Basel III type rules interact with simple standard and credit spread-augmented Taylor
rules, and compute the optimal policy combination which minimizes welfare losses and essentially
promotes nancial stability. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is a rst attempt to model the
interplay between bank capital, countercyclical regulation and the role of standard and augmented
monetary policy in a DSGE model with a borrowing cost channel altered by meaningful endogenous
nancial imperfections.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 details the equilibrium
properties and parameterization of the model. In Section 4 we examine simple and implementable
optimal policy rules which minimize a micro-founded welfare loss function. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of households, a nal good (FG) rm, intermediate good (IG) rms, com-
petitive commercial banks and a central bank, which also acts as the nancial regulator. At the
beginning of the period and following the realization of aggregate shocks, the representative bank
receives deposits from households, issues bank capital, and sets the loan rate based on the renance
rate, bank capital requirements, the risk premium and the probability of obtaining the IG rms
collateral seized in the case of default.9 For a given loan rate, the IG rms decide on the level of
employment, prices and loans, with the latter used to fund wage payments to households. Con-
7Clerc, Derviz, Mendicino, Moyen, Nikolov, Stracca, Suarez and Vardoulakis (2015) build a larger scale DSGE
model with three layers of default and nd an optimal bank capital ratio in steady state which exceeds the Basel
II 8 percent Cooke ratio. Compared to their model, we focus on optimal bank capital dynamics following nancial
and technology shocks, and examine the interaction between optimal bank capital rules and monetary policy rules
- a feature which is absent from the above paper. Furthermore, the smaller scale version of our model allows us to
disentangle the main transmission channels linking the nancial sector to the real economy, and to emphasize the
welfare implication of optimal simple bank capital and monetary policy rules in a setup featuring credit risk.
8 In the nancial accelerator models which operate through investment demand, output and ination exhibit a
strong co-movement (apart from cost push shocks). Thus, lowering the policy rate can simultaneously stabilize both
output and ination.
9As bank capital prices and dividend policies resulting from changes in the price of equity are not modeled in this
framework, bank capital in our model is treated more like bank debt rather than equity. In the Basel terminology,
bank capital in this model therefore consists of tier 2capital and not tier 1capital, which consists of equity stock
and retained earnings. Nevertheless, there is still an ongoing debate on whether under the new Basel III regulatory
rules, banks would also be allowed to hold capital in the form of loss-absorbing debt such as contingent convertible
bonds.
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currently, households choose the level of consumption, deposits and bank capital given their total
income. At the end of the period, the idiosyncratic shocks and hence the rms who default are
revealed. As loans are risky, the IG rms pledge output as collateral, which can be seized by the
lender in a default scenario. In these bad states of nature, there is also a possibility that the break
even bank does not recover any collateral and makes a loss. At the aggregate level, bank capital
covers for these losses, which are also endogenously related to the rmscredit risk. Furthermore,
households, acting as bank capital holders, know the aggregate state of the economy and can cal-
culate ex-ante banking sector losses. They account for these default costs by demanding a higher
return on bank capital such that they are indi¤erent between holding risk free deposits and bank
capital. We now turn to describe in more detail the behaviour of each agent in the economy.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed by i 2 (0; 1), who consume, hold deposits, demand
bank capital and supply di¤erentiated labour to a labour aggregator. The objective of each house-














where Ei;t is the expectations operator,  2 (0; 1) the discount factor, & the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption, and  the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. The
term Ct denotes consumption at time t; while Hi;t is the time-t hours worked by household i.
Households enter period t with real cash holdings of Mt: They receive their subsidized wage
bill (1 + w) (Wi;t=Pt)Hi;t, paid by the IG rm via the labour aggregator, in the form of cash
at the beginning of the period, with Wi;t denoting the nominal wage, Pt the price of the nal
good, and w the subsidy rate. The cash is then used to make deposits Dt at the bank, and for
investment in bank capital Vt (in real terms): The households remaining cash balances of Mt+
(1 + w) (Wi;t=Pt)Hi;t   Dt   Vt become available to purchase consumption goods subject to a
cash-in-advance constraint, Ct Mt + (1 + w) (Wi;t=Pt)Hi;t  Dt   Vt: At the end of the period,
households receive all real prot income from the nancial intermediation process (JFIt ) , and





10 Furthermore, households earn gross interest
payments on deposits and bank capital, denoted by RDt and (1 Vt )RVt , respectively. The term Vt
denotes the bank capital risk premium, which is derived endogenously later in the text, but taken





= Mt+(1 + w)
Wi;t
Pt




With a positive deposit rate (RDt > 1), and taking wages and prices as given, the rst order
10Prots from the FG rm are equal to zero.
11The timing of the model follows closely Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
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Equation (3) is the standard Euler equation determining the optimal consumption path. Equation
(4) is the no-arbitrage condition, relating the rate of return on bank capital to the risk free deposit
rate. In equilibrium, the interest rate on bank capital is set as a premium over the deposit rate due
to the ex-ante default costs in the banking sector (Vt ).
12
The wage setting environment follows closely Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), and Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), where each household i supplies a unique type of labour (Hi;t)
with i 2 (0; 1). All these types of labour are then aggregated by a competitive labour contractor









, with w > 1 representing the constant elasticity of substitution between
the di¤erent types of labour. The ith household therefore faces a demand curve for its labour,
Hi;t = (Wi;t=Wt)
 w Nt; where Wt denotes the aggregate nominal wage paid for one unit of the
composite labour. The zero prot condition for the labour aggregator yields the economy wide






1 w . Calvo (1983)-type nominal rigidities are assumed such
that in each period a constant fraction of 1  !w workers are able to re-optimize their wages while
a fraction of !w index their wages according to last periods price ination rate (t 1). These non
re-optimizing households therefore set their wages according to Wi;t = t 1Wi;t 1: Moreover, if
wages have not been set since period t; then at period t + s the real relative wage for household
i becomes (Wi;t+s=Wt+s) = sWi;t=Wt+s, where s = t  t+1  ::::  t+s 1. Consequently,
the demand for labour in period t + s is Hi;t+s = (sWi;t=Wt+s)
 w Nt+s. In equilibrium all re-
optimizing households choose the same wage (W t ), and the optimal relative wage in a log-linearized
form (denoted by hat) is given by \(W t =Wt) = [!w=(1  !w)] bWt , with bWt  cWt cWt 1 denoting
the wage ination. In the absence of wage rigidities (!w = 0), the subsidized real wage equals to
the wage mark-up [w= (w   1)] multiplied by the marginal rate of substitution between leisure




Nt = Ht. Employment is subsidized in order to eliminate the positive mark-up associated with the
monopolistic wage setting; (1 + w) = w= (w   1). In this way, the steady state of the model
satises (W=P ) = MRS; as in a perfectly competitive economy.13 ;14
12Markovic (2006) also derives a no-arbitrage condition between the bank capital rate and the risk free rate, with
the mark-up depending on an exogenously given risk of default (among other variables). In our model, the expected
default costs in the banking sector, which determine the bank capital - deposit rate spread, are endogenous with
respect to both the risk of default at the rm level and the bank capital to loan ratio.
13The full derivation of the wage setting environment is available upon request.
14Steady state values are denoted by dropping the time subscript.
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Finally, as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), the wage ination equation is shown to satisfy,
bWt = EtbWt+1 + (1  !w) (1  !w)(!w) (1 + w)
h
\MRSt  dWRt i ; (5)
where real wages evolve according to,
dWRt  \WtPt

= [WRt 1 + bWt   bPt ; (6)
with bPt  bPt  bPt 1 representing the log-linearized price ination rate as a deviation from its steady
state. The motivation for including sticky wages is threefold: First, sticky wages are necessary to
match the sluggish and persistent behaviour of real wages observed in data, and are important
for obtaining a persistent response of ination without relying on implausible values for price
stickiness (as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). Second, wage stickiness is crucial
for obtaining implementable optimal policy rules following supply shocks, which would otherwise
produce abnormally high optimal ination coe¢ cient weights in the Taylor rule (see Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2007)). Given that this paper examines implementable optimal policy rules and their
interactions with one another, there is an appeal in having a benchmark optimal ination coe¢ cient
within an unbounded reasonable range. Third, as recently documented by Debortoli, Kim, Lindé,
and Nunes (2015), a central bank loss function incorporating a nominal wage ination gap (as
present in this paper) provides a better approximation to the true households welfare function
than a simple standard output gap-ination based objective.
2.2 Final Good Firm
A perfectly competitive representative FG rm assembles a continuum of intermediate goods (Yj;t









; where p > 1. Given the IG price Pj;t, the demand function for each













2.3 Intermediate Good Firms
Each IG rm j 2 (0; 1) uses the homogeneous labour supplied by the labour contractor, and faces
the following linear production function,
Yj;t = Zj;tNj;t; Zj;t = At"
F
j;t; (7)
where Nj;t and Zj;t are the amount of homogeneous labour employed and the total productivity
shock experienced by rm j, respectively. The term At denotes a mean one, common economy wide




exp(At ); where &
A is
the autoregressive coe¢ cient and At is a normally distributed random shock with zero mean and
a constant variance. The expression "Fj;t represents an idiosyncratic shock with a constant variance
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distributed uniformly over the interval ("F ;"F ):15
As in Ravenna and Walsh (2006), the IG rm must borrow from a representative bank in order
to pay households wages in advance. Let Lj;t be the amount borrowed by rm j; then the (real)




Financing labour costs bears risk and in case of default the commercial bank expects to seize
rms output (Yj;t) with a probability of t. In these bad states of nature, there is also a possibility
of (1 t) that the bank cannot recover the IG rms collateral and therefore makes a loss (similar




exp(t ), where  2 (0; 1) denotes the steady state value of this probability,
& is the degree of persistence, and t is a random shock with a normal distribution and a constant
variance. A shock to the probability of recovering collateral (t) represents a nancial (credit)
shock in this model, as it directly a¤ects the value of collateralized output the bank can seize in
case of default, rmscredit risk and consequently credit spreads.
In the good states of nature, each rm pays back the bank principal plus interest on the loans
granted. Consequently, and in line with the willingness to pay approach to debt contracts, default
occurs when the expected value of seizable output (tYj;t) is less then the amount that needs to be
repaid to the lender at the end of the period: tYj;t < R
L
t Lj;t; where R
L
t denotes the interest rate
on loans granted to IG rms.16 Using equations (7) and (8), the cut-o¤ value ("F;Mj;t ) below which







Therefore, the threshold value is related to the lending rate, aggregate technology shocks and
the real wages and is identical across all rms. However, in our model, the loan rate not only
depends on the risk free rate and the nance premium (as in Agénor and Aizenman (1998) and
Agénor, Bratsiotis and Pfajfar (2014)), but also on the probability of the bank recovering collateral
(credit risk shocks), the total unit costs of bank capital, and the bank capital-loan ratio (as shown
in subsequent sections). Hence, both the loan rate and probability of default are a¤ected by the
nature of the regulatory regime. Given the uniform properties of "Ft ; an explicit closed-form solution
15We use the uniform distribution in order to generate plausible data-consistent steady state risk of default and
loan rate spreads as explained in the parameterization section. This simple distribution also allows for a closed-form
expression for credit risk. See also Faia and Monacelli (2007) who adopt a similar approach.
16Similar to Agénor and Aizenman (1998), we assume for simplicity that no IG rm defaults if the economy is at
the good state of nature and the level of output is su¢ ciently high to cover for the loan repayment. Furthermore,
t can also be interpreted as the fraction of collateral seized by the bank in the default state of nature, net of state
verication costs. Alternatively, the default condition can be re-arranged as (1  t)Yj;t > Yj;t   RLt Lj;t: That is,
the borrower (IG rm) can run awaywith itsnon-collateralized assets and if it does, it can only take (1  t)Yj;t:
Hence, if the value of the IG rms assets after running away is larger than what it would obtain by not running away,
then it would be optimal for the IG rm to default. In this way, t a¤ects the incentives of the borrower directly.
Specically, in our model the IG rm internalizes that the bank may not be able to retrieve some of the pledged
collateral and decides to default only when the expected level of seized output is lower than the nancing costs. In
that sense, (1  t) may be thought of as the probability of the IG rm running away with its collateral. With either
interpretation, t as a nancial shock enters the model identically.
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"F   "F : (10)
The IG rm solves a two stage pricing decision problem as soon as the aggregate shocks in period
t are realized. In the rst stage, each IG producer minimizes the cost of employing labour, taking
its (real) e¤ective costs (RLt W
R









In the second stage, each IG producer chooses the optimal price for its good. Here Calvo (1983)-
type contracts are assumed, where a portion of !p rms keep their prices xed while a portion of
1   !p rms adjust prices optimally given the going marginal cost and the loan rate (set at the
beginning of the period). Solving the standard IG rms problem yields the familiar form of the
log-linear New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC),
bPt = EtbPt+1 + (1  !p)(1  !p)!p cmct: (12)
In this model, the marginal cost is determined directly by the cost of borrowing from the bank
(from 11). Therefore, monetary policy, bank capital, credit risk and the regulatory regime, all of
which impact the loan rate as shown in the next sections, have also a direct e¤ect on the marginal
cost and accordingly on the rate of price ination, wage ination and output. To x ideas, we
refer to the channel which links between the loan rate, marginal cost, ination and output as the
borrowing cost channel.
2.4 The Banking Sector
2.4.1 Lending Rate Decision
Consider a continuum of perfectly competitive representative banks indexed by k 2 (0; 1), who raise
funds through deposits (Dt), bank capital (Vt) and a liquidity injection (Xt) from the central bank
in order to supply credit (Lt) to a continuum of rms. The balance in real terms is therefore,18
Lt = Dt + Vt +Xt; (13)
where Lt 
R 1
0 Lk;tdk is the aggregate lending to IG rms.
Each bank k expects to break even from its intermediation activity such that the expected
income from lending to a continuum of IG rms is equal to the total costs of borrowing deposits
17Below we show that the bank sets the loan rate based on the IG rms default decision and threshold default
value. Therefore, the risk of default has also a direct e¤ect on the IG rms marginal cost through its endogenous
impact on the cost of borrowing.
18The aggregate lending from the banking sector is given by
R 1
0
Lk;tdk , where each bank k lends to contiumn of
rms with identical loan demands. Because loans are identical for all banks the k subscript can be dropped.
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t (Dt +Xt) + cVt; (14)
where f("Fj;t) is the probability density function of "
F
j;t. The rst element on the left hand side
is the repayment to the bank in the non-default states, while the second element is the expected
return to the bank in the default states accounted for the probability of collateral recovery (t).
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The expression RVt Vt + R
D
t (Dt +Xt) is the total return to households and the central bank for
providing funds to the bank. Furthermore, the bank faces a linear cost function when issuing bank
capital, captured by the term cVt, with c > 0. These costs are independent of the state of the
economy and reect steady administrative costs associated with underwriting or issuing brochures
for example. They can also be interpreted as an additional tax on bank capital resembling a tax
advantage of debt over equity (not explicitly modeled here), which increases the spread between
the overall cost of capital (RVt + c) and the rate on deposits (R
D
t ). Following the derivation of the
loan rate and the bank capital risk premia, we discuss in more detail why including these costs are
important in this framework.




































































Real wages and the amount of labour employed are identical for each rm and therefore the volume
of lending by each bank is also the same. Thus, the subscript j is dropped in what follows. Dening









241  R "F;Mt"F ["F;Mt  "Ft ]f("Ft )d"Ft
"F;Mt
35 1 > 1 is dened as the nance premium.
19The extra liquidity provided by the central bank can also be thought of as a central bank loan paid back at the
risk free deposit rate. Nevertheless, introducing a liquidity injection is simply to allow the markets to clear (as in
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and in the rest of the cost channel literature). In this model, the commercial bank is
indi¤erent between borrowing deposits from households and receiving a central bank loan such that the loan rate
pricing decision is una¤ected.
20Recall that with probability (1   t) the bank receives no collateral in the bad states of nature and therefore
makes a loss. However, at the aggregate level and ex-post, the banking sector prots are equal to zero.
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2.4.2 The Bank Capital Risk Premium Rate
The premium on a unit of bank capital (Vt ) determines the mark-up of the bank capital rate over
the risk free deposit rate in the households no-arbitrage condition (equation 4). As explained
earlier, commercial banks set the loan rate in each period to the expected break even level. This
implies that the price of loans is determined by the cost of deposits and bank capital, adjusted for
the risk premium and the bank capital-loan ratio. Additionally, a fraction (1  t) of banks su¤er
a loss due to their inability to retrieve collateral from defaulting rms.
Households, who invest bank capital in all banks, know the aggregate level of rm default
and are able to calculate aggregate ex-ante losses in the banking sector.21 Accounting for bank
losses, that translate into bank capital default, ensures that deposits are a safe asset. The decision
for households therefore involves calculating the bank capital ex-ante default rate such that the
no-arbitrage condition (given by equation 4) is satised. Specically,
Vt R
V










Identity (17) guarantees that the total losses on bank capital (Vt R
V
t Vt) are equal to the value
of collateral the banks expected to earn if they were able to retrieve tYj;t in the default states
of nature, weighted by the probability of being a loss-incurring bank (1   t).22 Combining and
substituting equations (7), (8) and (9) and using the properties of the uniform distribution in (17)
results in the risk premium required for holding bank capital,






















which stems from the possibility of banks making a loss in the states of nature where rms default on
their credit. The bank capital risk premium also depends negatively on the bank capital-loan ratio,
which, in turn, is determined by the regulatory requirements. The upshot is that the funds raised
through the premium on bank capital are necessary to guarantee that all loss-incurring banks are
able to honour their commitment towards all depositors, whilst households are indi¤erent between
investing in bank capital and deposits.
21Note that neither the bank nor the household are able to distinguish ex ante which banks will be unable to claim
collateral. Only the proportion t is known.
22Note that the remaining t proportion of banks make a prot of
R "F;Mj;t
"F
[(1  t)Yj;t] f("Fj;t)d"Fj;t such that the
aggregate gains from non-defaulting banks would o¤set exactly the losses outlined in equation (17). Banks are
assumed not to be risk sharing with aggregate nancial intermediation prots transferred back to households as a
lump-sum at the end of the period. Signicantly, all households receive a share of these prots regardless of whether or
not they invest in bank capital. As a result, what matters for the households bank capital decision is the no-arbitrage
condition capturing ex-ante banking sector losses, rather than the lump-sum transfer of prots.
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2.4.3 Bank Capital Requirements and Countercyclical Regulation
The representative bank is subject to minimum risk sensitive bank capital requirements imposed
by the central bank and set according to the Basel accords. At the beginning of each period the
bank must issue a certain amount of capital that covers a given percentage of its loans to IG rms.
The bank capital requirement is set equal to a simple exponential function,
Vt
Lt








with  denoting the minimum capital adequacy requirements, also known as the Cooke Ratio (set
by legislation). The term  2 (0; 1) denotes a persistence parameter capturing the idea of policy
makers altering required capital very smoothly. This is in part due to implementations lags, where
banks may not be able to raise substantial amount of capital quickly, and because policy makers
can be uncertain as to the macroeconomic impact of their actions. The term C is an adjustment
parameter that allows for dynamic bank capital requirements responding to deviations in cyclical
risk.23
Through equation (19), we can examine the di¤erences between Basel I, Basel II and Basel III
regulatory regimes. Specically, C = 0 reproduces the Basel I regime, in which the capital ratio
is xed and set to  = 0:08: Values of C > 0 mimic the minimum capital requirements under the
foundation Internal Ratings Based (IRB) of Basel II, where the regulatory ratio increases with the
perceived credit risk in the banks loan portfolio. Negative values for C < 0 would imply that
bank capital requirements increase (decrease) in periods of low (high) credit risk. As the risk of
default in our model is endogenously and negatively related to output and lending, imposing C < 0
means that bank capital requirements should be loosened (tightened) during economic recessions
(expansions). This type of countercyclical bank capital requirement rule is consistent with the
proposed Basel III accords (see BCBS (2011, 2012)).
2.4.4 The Transmission Channels of Risk and Bank Capital on the Loan Rate
Applying the characteristics of the uniform distribution and the bank capital requirement (19), the









(RVt + c RDt )
9=; ; (20)
23Our specication for bank capital requirements is similar to Angeloni and Faia (2013), who relate bank capital
directly to deviations of output from its steady state level. Because risk in our model is endogenously and negatively
linked to output and lending, responding directly to the business/nancial cycle would produce similar policy im-
plications. Some models, which abstract from an endogenous risk of default, use loans or the loan-output ratio to
dene a countercyclical regulatory rule. Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2014), for example, emphasize the role of the
loan-output ratio as an important indicator of nancial risk. In practice, bank capital requirements should respond
to systemic bank risk. However, the endogenous credit risk in our model is the source of the nancial frictions.
Thus, we employ a bank capital rule which targets the main variable that produces the nancial accelerator e¤ects
and largely drives the movements in both real and nancial variables through the borrowing cost channel. In the
absence of a well-dened variable capturing systemic bank risk, the most suitable and important variable bank capital
requirements can respond to in this setup is credit risk. In fact, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) nd that
bank failures are generally positively correlated with nonperforming loans - measured by credit risk in this model.
14








1 is dened as the nance premium, which itself increases endogenously with the lending rate
(from equations 9 and 10). As a clear analytical solution to the quadratic loan rate equation is
unattainable, we resort later to numerical solutions which illuminate the channels explained in this
section.24
Equation (20) shows that the loan rate is positively related to the deposit rate, the nance
premium, the bank capital-deposit rate spread and the issuance cost of bank capital. The bank
capital-deposit rate spread and the cost of issuing bank capital, in turn, are set as a proportion of
the bank capital-loan ratio, which is determined by the Cooke Ratio (), and the cyclical adjustment
parameter (C) prevailing under Basel II or Basel III.
We identify various channels through which the probability of default impacts the loan rate.
The rst, dened as the bank capital default channel, stems from a combination of a positive level of
default costs on bank capital and the no-arbitrage condition, relating the bank capital rate to the
deposit rate and to the bank capital risk premium rate (Vt ). The risk premium on bank capital,
in turn, relates positively to the risk of default at the IG rm level and negatively to the bank
capital-loan ratio (see equations 4 and 18). Second, the nance premium channel, arising from the
positive correlation between the risk of default and the nance premium, which directly inuences
the cost of credit. Third, under Basel II and Basel III, the probability of default a¤ects the lending
rate through the bank capital requirements channel, in which the sign of C determines the direction
of adjustment in bank capital.
The bank capital-loan ratio in our model has an ambiguous impact on the loan rate. On the
one hand, tighter bank capital regulation increases the cost of credit through the direct positive
relationship between RLt and the positive spread R
V
t + c   RDt (set as a fraction of t = Vt=Lt).
On the other hand, a rise in the bank capital-loan ratio reduces the risk premium on bank capital,
thereby lowering the loan rate via the bank capital default channel (see equation 18). With higher
bank capital requirements, there is a higher equity base to absorb commercial bank losses resulting
in an attenuation e¤ect on the bank capital premium rate, the bank capital-deposit rate spread
and the cost of credit.
The decline in the bank capital risk premium brought about by the higher capital ratio is
consistent with the logic of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem and supported by a large
body of empirical evidence (see Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004); Coleman, Esho and Sharpe
(2006); and Kashyap, Stein and Hanson (2010)). Moreover, Admati and Hellwig (2014) argue that
bank capital is inexpensive and lowers the risk premium on equity, leading also to fewer distortions
in lending decisions and to better performing banks. In our model, the contradicting e¤ects of
bank capital regulation on the loan rate largely o¤set one another in steady state and minimize
the role for time-varying regulation in the model dynamics. The e¤ectiveness of dynamic capital
requirements is restored when some small additional issuance costs of bank capital (c) are added
(see for example Covas and Fujita (2010) and Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010)).25 This
cost (resembling a tax advantage of debt over equity) puts the increase in the weighted average
24However, in the appendix we solve the loan rate equation in steady state using some simplifying assumptions,
which helps to better understand the role of bank capital requirements.
25Through numerical methods we show that in order for the steady state loan rate to increase following a rise in
bank capital requirements, c  0:0014: In the simulations we use a larger value of c to ensure a plausible steady state
loan rate.
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cost of capital and the loan rate following a rise in bank capital into a reasonable empirical range
(see also Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011)).
A key element in this setup is that the probability of default is a function of the loan rate,
while the bank capital rate is a function of default risk and commercial bank losses (from the no-
arbitrage condition). Hence, an adverse shock, associated with falling levels of output (collateral),
leads to increased nancial risk, and accordingly results in a rise in the bank capital rate and
regulatory requirements (in the benchmark Basel II case where C > 0). The increase in bank
capital costs then translate into a rise in the loan rate, thereby fuelling additional upward pressure
on the risk of default and the bank capital premium rate, all of which ultimately amplify the initial
increase in the lending rate. Therefore, the probability of default, through its relationship with
regulatory requirements, the bank capital rate and the borrowing costs, aggravates the impact on
the rest of the nancial and economic variables. These frictions give rise to signicant nancial
accelerator e¤ects, supporting the general consensus in the literature regarding the procyclical
nature of banking and more specically of Basel II. The upshot is that macroprudential policy
(Basel III, C < 0) is warranted in order to insulate the e¤ects of the borrowing cost channel and
nancial sector procyclicality on the real economy.
2.5 Monetary Policy















where  2 (0; 1) is the degree of interest rate smoothing and ; Y > 0 coe¢ cients measuring
the relative weights on ination and output deviations from their steady state targets, respectively.







, where s  0: Thus,
the central bank sets its policy rate also in part to deviations of credit spreads from their steady
state level (see also Cúrdia and Woodford (2010)).27 In this way, following adverse shocks produc-
ing an output-ination trade-o¤, the probability of default and loan rate increase, both of which
reduce lending and increase credit spreads. With s > 0; the policy rate falls and mitigates the
initial increase in the lending rate, thereby dampening the contraction in credit and output, whilst
mitigating the rise in ination. However, an increase in the output gap followed by a lower policy
rate may exert additional inationary pressures through the standard demand channel of monetary
policy.
3 Equilibrium and Parameterization
In line with the cost channel literature and for the goods market to clear, we assume the size of






26Using a no arbitrage condition and assuming no required reserves policies, the deposit rate is equal to the policy
rate (RDt = R
cb
t ).
27Having the Taylor rule responding negatively to risk or positively to loans (or loan growth) in this model would





 Mt.28 Following the nancial intermediation process, the central bank (acting also as
the nancial authority in the model) receives RDt Xt+cVt = J
FI
t ; which is rebated back to households
as a lump-sum.29 In a symmetric equilibrium (Pj;t = Pt; Hj;t = Ht; Lj;t = Lt), we substitute the
IG rms prots, total prots from the nancial intermediation process, the equilibrium condition
in the market for loans (WRt Ht = Dt + Vt + Xt), the no-arbitrage condition (4), and the size of
the liquidity injection plus the labour income subsidy in identity (2) to obtain the market clearing
condition, Yt = Ct.
To solve the model, we log-linearize the behavioral equations and the resource constraints
around the non-stochastic, zero ination (P;T = 1) steady state and take the percentage deviation
from their counterparts under exible prices and wages. The model is calibrated, where applicable,
within the range of the parameters proposed by Smets and Wouters (2003,2007) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).30 The baseline parameterization values are summarized in the
following Table 1,
Table 1: Benchmark Parameterization
Parameter Value Description
 0.99 Discount Factor
& 1.00 Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption
 2.00 Inverse of the Frisch Elasticity of Labour Supply
w 6.00 Elasticity of Demand - Labour
!w 0.64 Degree of Wage Stickiness
p 6.00 Elasticity of Demand - Intermediate Goods
!p 0.60 Degree of Price Stickiness
A 1.00 Average Productivity Parameter
"F 1.36 Idiosyncratic Productivity Shock Upper Range
"F 1.00 Idiosyncratic Productivity Shock Lower Range
 0.97 Probability of Banks Recovering Collateral
 0.00 Degree of Persistence in Regulatory Rule
D 0.08 Capital Adequacy Ratio
C 0.05 Elasticity of Regulatory Rule wrt to Risk
c 0.25 Administrative Cost of Issuing Bank Capital
 0.70 Degree of Persistence in Interest Rate Rule
 2.00 Response of Policy Rate to Ination Deviations
Y 0.00 Response of Policy Rate to Output Deviations
s 0.00 Response of Policy Rate to Credit Spreads
&A 0.91 Degree of Persistence - Supply Shock
& 0.90 Degree of Persistence - Credit Shock
28Government is a veil in this model so for simplicity we assume that it is the central bank which subsidizes
labour income and provides the liquidity injection. This liquidity injection and money carried over between periods,
nonetheless, are introduced simply to clear the goods market, and have no meaningful e¤ects in this model (see also
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000)).
29Recall that aggregate ex-post prots in the commercial banking sector are equal to zero.
30The results we present in the next sections are robust to changes in the standard parameters of the model such
as the discount factor, wage and price rigidities (within plausible ranges), intertemporal substitution in consumption
and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. We focus in this section on the parameters new to this model.
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Elaborating now on some parameters unique to this model; we set the idiosyncratic productivity
shocks range to (1; 1:36), and the steady state probability of the bank recovering collateral () to
97%.31 Moreover, the bank capital adequacy ratio () is set to 0:08; which represents a oor value
under Basel II. These numbers, together with a price mark-up of 20%, generate a steady state credit
risk of 3:82%, a long run value of 2:48% for the return on bank capital and a loan rate of 3:15%.32
All these estimates are consistent with values found for advanced economies. In our benchmark case
before calculating optimal policy rules, we implement a Basel II regime (C = 0:05) and standard
Taylor rule parameters ( = 0:7;  = 2:0; Y = 0 and s = 0).
33 The degree of persistence in the
regulatory rule () is set to 0; as we nd that including this parameter increases welfare losses
when the regulatory rule (C) is set optimally.34
Finally, we calibrate the persistence parameters (& i) and standard deviations (s:d(it)) associ-
ated with nancial (i = ) and technology (i = A) shocks to approximately match the standard
deviations of loan rates, output and ination in the U.S. data, over the period 2000:Q1-2015:Q2.
The choice of the prior distributions are the same as those used in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2014). For nancial shocks we obtain & = 0:90 and s:d(t ) = 0:124; while for supply shocks the
results imply &A = 0:91 and s:d(At ) = 0:088:
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4 Optimal Simple Policy Rules and Welfare
This section provides an analysis of the optimal mix of conventional and macroprudential policy
instruments outlined above. The central banks objective function is given by a second order
approximation around the e¢ cient steady state of the households ex-ante expected utility written
31Reducing the steady state value of the probability , which is a key nancial friction in this model, raises the cost
of borrowing in the long run as well as amplies the response of both nancial and real variables following various
shocks.
32 Indeed, the combination of values for ; c;  and p are chosen so that the various steady state spreads and risk
of default are consistent with the data.
33Under the foundation internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, the equivalent to C lies between 0:05
and 0:10 (see Covas and Fujita (2010) and Aguiar and Drumond (2009)). Furthermore, a response to output (Y ) in
the Taylor rule results in negligible welfare gains and is therefore ignored for the purpose of our optimal policy analysis
(see also Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)). Abstracting from Y also allows us to clearly establish and understand the
interaction between the response to ination in the standard Taylor rules and the new macroprudential instruments.
Our baseline parameterization of  and  follows the benchmark case of Benes and Kumhof (2015).
34 In other words,  is optimally set to 0 when searched along the (0; 1) grid.
35Our estimation results for the persistence and standard deviations of nancial shocks are not inconsistent with
Benes and Kumhof (2015), who also use additional shocks to calibrate their model. Evidently, our model is small
scale and absent of habit persistence, physical capital, investment and additional various shocks (all of which are
important to capture the quantitative volatilities as observed in the data). For future work, it would be interesting
to build a larger scale model that could be taken to the data more easily, which would also enable us to calibrate the
rest of the parameters of the model. Such a model would surely also feature a wider range of nancial and real shocks.
















bPt +  & 1 +  var(bY gt ) + wkw var(bWt )

; (22)
where kp = (1   !p)(1   !p)=!p; kw = (1 !w)(1 !w)!w(1+w) and bY gt = bYt   bY et is the welfare relevant
output gap. The term bY et = (1 + )=  & 1 +  bZt is the e¢ cient level of output chosen by the
social planner who can overcome all the nominal and nancial frictions in this economy. Similar to
Ravenna and Walsh (2006), the presence of the borrowing cost channel creates a wedge between
the natural and e¢ cient level of output; bY et   bY nt = 1=  & 1 +  R^L;nt ; where bY nt and R^L;nt denote
the natural level (indexed by superscript n) of output and loan rate prevailing under exible prices
and wages.37
We study various optimal policy rules aimed at minimizing the loss function elements of the
above welfare function. The policy rules examined are: Policy I (benchmark) - Basel II (C = 0:05)
and a standard Taylor rule ( = 2:0 and s = 0). Policy II - Basel II regime and the central
bank responding optimally to ination in the Taylor rule (solving for , and setting exogenously
C = 0:05 and s = 0). Policy III - Basel II and an optimal response to ination and credit spreads
(solving for  and s, and setting 
C = 0:05). Policy IV - an ination targeting monetary policy
rule and optimal bank capital regulation (solving for  and 
C , and setting s = 0). Policy V -
a credit spread-augmented Taylor rule and optimal macroprudential regulation (solving for ,
C
and s). The optimal parameters that minimize the welfare loss function are grid-searched within
the following ranges:  = [1 : 10]; s = [0 : 1] and 
C = [ 250 : 1] with step of 0:01.
We perform the comparison among the alternative policies in terms of a consumption equivalent
() given by the fraction of consumption required to equate welfare under benchmark Policy I, to
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; where j refers to Policies II-IV and
superscript I is Policy I. Given the specied utility function and with & = 1, the expression for 



















representing the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility under









the welfare associated with the benchmark
36The derivation of the welfare loss function strictly follows Erceg, Henderson and Levine (2000) who introduce
wage rigidities, and Ravenna and Walsh (2006) who incorporate the monetary policy cost channel. In the e¢ cient
steady state, wage and price markups are eliminated through appropriate subsidies. The detailed derivation of the
loss function is available upon request.
37The richer borrowing cost channel therefore does not change the structure of the loss function compared to
standard new Keynesian models with staggered wages. However, unlike Ravenna and Walsh (2006), where R^L;nt = 0;
in our model the presence of the various nancial frictions also lead to deviations in R^L;nt and hence generate the
wedge between bY nt and bY et (see also Airaudo and Olivero (2014)).
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Policy I. A higher positive  implies a larger welfare gain and hence indicates that the policy is
more desirable from a welfare point of view. The steady state is independent of the monetary policy
rule (; s) and the type of bank capital regulation (
C) so our computation of social welfare is
comparable across all policy rules.
Table 2 shows the optimal simple policy rules, the standard deviations (measured in terms of
the theoretical moments) of the variables comprising of the loss function, and the welfare gain in
units of steady state consumption following a 1 standard deviation shock to t; and a 1 standard
deviation shock to At:38
Table 2: Optimal Simple Policy Rules and Standard Deviations
Credit Shock Supply Shock
Policy I = 2:00 s:d
bPt = 0:0151 = 2:00 s:dbPt = 0:0537
s=   s:d(bY gt )= 0:0563 s=   s:d(bY gt )= 0:1109
C= 0:05 s:d(bWt )= 0:0054 C= 0:05 s:d(bWt )= 0:0218
 =    =  
Policy II = 1:01 s:d
bPt = 0:0152 = 1:93 s:dbPt = 0:0539
s=   s:d(bY gt )= 0:0301 s=   s:d(bY gt )= 0:1046
C= 0:05 s:d(bWt )= 0:0051 C= 0:05 s:d(bWt )= 0:0220
 = 0:0829  = 0:0007
Policy III = 1:01 s:d
bPt = 0:0152 = 1:93 s:dbPt = 0:0539
s= 0:00 s:d(bY gt )= 0:0301 s= 0:00 s:d(bY gt )= 0:1046
C= 0:05 s:d(bWt )= 0:0051 C= 0:05 s:d(bWt )= 0:0220
 = 0:0829  = 0:0007
Policy IV = ANY s:d
bPt = 0:00 = 9:30 s:dbPt = 0:0016
s=   s:d(bY gt )= 0:00 s=   s:d(bY gt )= 0:0527
C=  0:11 s:d(bWt )= 0:00 C=  196 s:d(bWt )= 0:0032
 = 0:2579  = 0:2684
Policy V = ANY s:d
bPt = 0:00 = 9:30 s:dbPt = 0:0016
s= ANY s:d(bY gt )= 0:00 s= 0:00 s:d(bY gt )= 0:0527
C=  0:11 s:d(bWt )= 0:00 C=  196 s:d(bWt )= 0:0032
 = 0:2579  = 0:2684
Note:  is a measure of welfare gain in units of steady-state consumption
4.1 Financial (Credit) Shock
Figure 1 depicts the impulse response functions associated with the optimal policy parameters
calculated in Table 2 following a 1 percent adverse nancial shock.
38The value C = 0:05 in Policies I,II,III is not optimized and is the benchmark regulatory regime (Basel II) in
this model.
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i) Figure 1 compares between Policy I (Standard Taylor Rule (STR)), Policy II
(identical to Policy III - Optimal Taylor Rule (OTR)) and Policy IV (identical to
Policy V - Optimal Taylor Rule + Countercyclical Rule (OTR+CCR)). ii) Interest
rates, ination rate, the probability of default and the bank capital-loan ratio are
measured in percentage point deviations from steady state. The rest of the variables
are measured in terms of percentage deviations.
In benchmark Policy I, a negative credit shock leads to a rise in the probability of default and
consequently the loan rate through the bank capital default and nance premium channels. With
a Basel II regime (C = 0:05 > 0), bank capital requirements increase, inducing an amplication
e¤ect on the borrowing costs and credit risk. It can be shown that both the bank capital default
and the bank capital requirement channels lead to an exacerbation in the loan rate and risk of
default behaviour compared to the Basel I case (C = 0) and to the scenario where banks are
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not subject to any capital regulation.39 The increase in the loan rate, coupled with the rise in
risk, raises the marginal cost, increases price ination and lowers output through the borrowing
cost channel. Moreover, with standard Taylor rule parameters ( = 2:0), the policy rate rises in
response to the increase in prices, thereby generating an additional upward shift in the bank capital
and loan rates, and fuelling a further decline in both aggregate demand and lending. This result
captures the trade-o¤ between price ination and output following nancial shocks, consistent with
the empirical ndings of Gilchrist, Schoenle, Sim and Zakrajsek (2016) - see also the e¢ ciency
frontier (Taylor curve) below that highlights this result. The fall in real wages, as a result of lower
output and higher price ination, attenuates the rise in the marginal cost, but this moderation
e¤ect is relatively small given the nature of the nancial shock hitting directly credit spreads.
A more moderated response to ination in the Taylor rule (Policy II) provides non-negligible
welfare gains compared to a standard monetary policy rule (Policy I). Intuitively, for economies
where credit plays a key role for rms nancing, responding too aggressively to price ination may
prompt higher borrowing costs and increased procyclicality in output, prices, wages and nancial
variables. By mitigating the rise in the policy rate, the inationary impact of the borrowing cost
channel is dampened, which leads to a relative improvement in output and wages. At the same
time, the muted rise in the renance rate can also exert higher inationary pressures through the
standard demand channel of monetary policy. Compared to Policy I, Policy II has a limited impact
on price and wage ination due to these conicting channels. However, given the lower volatility
in output, it is optimal to respond only minimally to ination in the Taylor rule ( = 1:01).
In Policy III, we observe that a credit spread-augmented monetary policy rule does not promote
overall welfare as it increases volatility in price and wage ination, despite mitigating output losses.
By calculating the theoretical moments, our experiments show that even just a small reaction to
credit spreads (s = 0:01), when  is set optimally at 1:01; increases the standard deviation in
price ination from 0:0152 to 0:0162; and in wage ination from 0:0051 to 0:0062; while reducing
the standard deviation in output from 0:0301 to 0:0264. Intuitively, lowering the policy rate due to
higher credit spreads increases initially the level of output through an intertemporal substitution
e¤ect, and attenuates the rise in the loan rate through the monetary policy cost channel. However,
the relative rise in output and therefore the output gap, brought about by the fall in the renance
rate, translates into an increase in price ination through the standard demand channel of monetary
policy. Given our standard parameterization, the latter channel dominates such that a fall in the
policy rate is indeed inationary. Importantly, note that uctuations in nancial variables (loans,
credit spreads and default risk) display high levels of endogenous persistence compared to the
aggregate macro variables (output and ination). Thus, a reaction to a nancial indicator in the
Taylor rule implies a more prolonged relative expansion in aggregate demand, which, in turn,
leads to a sustained rise in price and wage ination via the monetary policy demand channel. This
outcome highlights why monetary policy leaning against nancial instability (as measured by credit
spreads and risk of default in this model) may be welfare detrimental, especially with a relatively
stronger weight attached to price and wage ination variances compared to the output gap volatility
in the micro-founded welfare function.
An optimal Basel III type countercyclical regulatory policy (C =  0:11) provides the most
targeted approach as it directly suppresses the inationary e¤ect of credit spreads and the borrowing
cost channel as well as shuts down all output and wage ination uctuations (see Policies IV
39These simulations are available upon request.
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and V).40 Put di¤erently, following credit shocks, an optimal well-designed macroprudential rule
eliminates the standard output-price ination-wage ination trade-o¤ faced by the central bank and
improves welfare by 0:2579 percent of permanent consumption compared to the benchmark policy.
This welfare gain followed by an implementation of a nancial macroprudential tool is large by
the standards of the literature (see Unsal (2013) and Angeloni and Faia (2013), for example), but
reinforces the signicant welfare improvement found in the estimated model of Benes and Kumhof
(2015).41 In fact, during an adverse credit cycle, a simple implementable macroprudential policy
rule associated with a fall of around 0:08 percentage points in bank capital requirements (well within
the bank capital bu¤er range of 0 to 2:5 percentage point deviation as proposed by Basel III) achieves
fully optimal policy corresponding with zero welfare losses.42 Moreover, once the countercyclical
rule is set optimally, the extent to which the monetary policy rule reacts to ination and/or to
credit spreads is irrelevant since all gaps are closed and the policy rate remains unchanged.43 An
overreaction in the countercyclical rule can generate excessive easing in bank capital requirements,
that overly reduce total bank funding costs and create a credit-fuelled economic boom inherent in
increased welfare losses. Figure 2 illustrates the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential regulation, the
welfare detrimental aspects of a strict ination targeting rule, and the point at which welfare losses
(measured in absolute value) are minimized, and monetary policy rules become futile.
40The easing of bank capital requirements implied by the optimal macroprudential rule o¤sets the rise in the loan
rate following the adverse nancial shock. At the same time, lower bank capital requirements can also increase the
cost of borrowing via the bank capital default channel as explained earlier. Given our parameterization with a small
positive c, the direct positive relationship between bank capital requirements and the lending rate dominates the
negative link between the bank capital-loan ratio and the bank capital premium rate, which positively impacts the
loan rate. The focus is therefore on the positive interaction between bank capital requirements and the borrowing
costs, which is also more consistent with empirical studies.
41 In Unsal (2013), the welfare gain from broad macroprudential policies comes mainly from optimal monetary
policy rules reacting also against nancial imbalances rather than from a nancial regulatory instrument. Conversely,
following empirically-relevant bank riskiness shocks, Benes and Kumhof (2015) nd that a countercyclical capital
bu¤er leads to signicant welfare benets, and also reduces the role for credit-augmented monetary policy rules. Our
policy results are therefore more in line with the latter paper.
42Bianchi (2011) nds that a simple macroprudential policy in the form of xed tax on debt can nearly replicate a
fully optimal policy.
43The only restriction is that  must be greater than 1 to ensure determinacy.
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Figure 2 - Relationship Between  ; 



























The results above show that macroprudential regulation in the form of countercyclical capital
regulation can achieve the primary mandates of the central bank and deliver zero welfare losses
following nancial shocks. To further illustrate how countercyclical regulation responding to credit
risk can minimize the trade-o¤s between output variability, price ination variability and wage
ination variability, we construct an e¢ ciency frontier (Taylor curve) that includes these three
objectives of the policy maker (as implied by our micro-founded welfare loss function).44 For this
purpose, we plot the Taylor curves with and without macroprudential policy.
Figure 3 presents our three-dimensional policy frontier under Basel II and Basel III. As clearly
illustrated under the Basel II (C > 0) benchmark case, there is a clear trade-o¤ between the three
bank objectives following a 1 percent nancial shock (in line with Gilchrist, Schoenle, Sim and
Zakrajsek (2016)). Under Basel III (C < 0), nonetheless, this trade-o¤ is considerably alleviated
as there is lower volatility in output, price ination and wage ination. Compared to Rubio and
Carrasco-Gallego (2014), our results suggest that macroprudential regulation, even on its own, can
produce a more stable economic system, while monetary policy, under nancial shocks, plays only
a minimal role.45
44See also Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) who evaluate the performance of a Taylor rule in minimizing vari-
ability in output, ination and borrowing.
45 Including a measure of nancial stability, such as credit spreads, loans or loan to GDP, would not change our
results given the interconnection between the nancial sector and the real economy in this model.
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Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions associated with the optimal policy parameters ob-
tained in Table 2 for an adverse 1 percent supply shock.
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Figure 4 - Negative Supply Shock with Optimal Policy Rules





















































































i) Figure 4 compares between Policy I (Standard Taylor Rule (STR)), Policy II
(identical to Policy III - Optimal Taylor Rule (OTR)) and Policy IV (identical to
Policy V - Optimal Taylor Rule + Countercyclical Rule (OTR+CCR)). ii) Interest
rates, ination rate, the probability of default and the bank capital-loan ratio are
measured in percentage point deviations from steady state. The rest of the variables
are measured in terms of percentage deviations.
In benchmark Policy I, a negative supply shock directly lowers the level of GDP and raises price
ination via the NKPC equation. As output falls, collateral declines as well, which, through the
nance premium channel, increases both the probability of default and the loan rate. The bank
capital default and Basel II (C = 0:05 > 0) channels behave similarly to adverse credit shocks
and result in a further amplication in the reaction of the loan rate and risk of default. Note
also that the output gap rises as this variable is measured in terms of the deviations of output
from its e¢ cient level (bY gt = bYt   bY et ; where bY et = (1 + )=  & 1 +  bZt). Beyond the direct
impact of the productivity shock, the higher loan rate aggravates the response of price ination
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and lowers real wages, which, in turn, has an attenuating e¤ect on the probability of default and
the lending rate. Compared to adverse nancial shocks, the drop in real wages is relatively stronger
following technology shocks, thereby reducing the impact of the borrowing cost channel. However,
given the nature of the supply shock and the various nancial accelerator mechanisms led by bank
capital requirements under Basel II, the loan rate and credit spreads increase, output falls, ination
rises and loans decrease. Finally, the policy rate rises in response to the hike in ination, thereby
stimulating a further decline in output.
In Policy II, optimal monetary policy suggests a slightly lower response to ination in the
Taylor rule as it mitigates the fall in the output gap. Excessively high ination coe¢ cient weights
are avoided as they would lead to an intensied rise in ination, thereby fuelling additional volatility
in this variable. The slightly lower weight on ination ( = 1:93) mitigates the inationary impact
of the monetary policy cost channel, although this rise in ination is largely o¤set by the fall in the
output gap (the standard demand channel of monetary policy). Furthermore, nancially-augmented
monetary policy rules add zero welfare gains as they act to increase output gap ine¢ ciencies, leading
to higher variances in price and wage ination (Policy III).
Similar to credit shocks, countercyclical bank capital regulation has an important role in reduc-
ing welfare losses. Nevertheless, and unlike credit shocks, an optimal very aggressive countercyclical
regulatory rule (C =  196) is also welfare improving. Intuitively, deviations in price ination, out-
put and wage ination stem mainly from the direct e¤ect of the productivity shock rather than the
secondary impact resulting from the loan rate behaviour. Credit shocks, nonetheless, impact wages
and ination through their e¤ect on the lending rate, which then feeds into the rest of the economy
via the borrowing cost channel. In other words, the strength of the borrowing cost channel follow-
ing technology shocks is relatively weaker compared to nancial shocks. This implies that a much
stronger countercyclical bank capital rule is needed in order to promote macroeconomic stability
and welfare following supply shocks. Easing bank capital requirements by roughly 0:4 percentage
points, again within the bank capital bu¤er range advocated by the Basel committee, reduces bank
funding costs to the extent that it generates a fall in credit spreads. This helps to further o¤set
some of the increase in the marginal cost and price ination, although does not eliminate completely
the standard e¤ects of the supply shock and specically the output gap-ination trade-o¤.
In Policy IV we also observe a complementarity e¤ect between the use of the countercyclical
rule and the response to ination in the Taylor rule. Increasing (in absolute value) the weight
on the countercyclical rule reduces the cost of credit, thereby creating dis-inationary pressures.
This prompts the central bank to weigh ination more heavily ( = 9:30) in order to e¤ectively
adjust the real interest rate in the Euler Equation and to avoid a further escalation in the output
gap. Overly high ination coe¢ cients ( > 9:30) are avoided as they suppress the relative rise in
output, which would exaggerate losses associated with wage ination in the central banks objec-
tive function.46 Finally, with an optimal macroprudential rule and consequently a higher optimal
response to ination in the monetary policy rule, there is no welfare gain from the central bank
leaning against the credit cycle (Policy V).
Figure 5 illustrates this complementarity between the weight on ination and the countercyclical
rule. Macroprudential regulation can restore the strong anti-ination stance in the Taylor rule, and
the combination of both these rules yields the lowest welfare losses (measured in absolute value).47
46 Indeed, if the central banks objective function consisted only of ination and output gap volatilities, the optimal
weights on  and 
C ; when determined jointly, tend towards 1 and  1, respectively.
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Figure 5 - Relationship Between  ; 





























The general conclusion drawn from these experiments is that Basel III type rules, which directly
impact the nancial market conditions and the real economy via the borrowing cost channel, can
e¤ectively promote price stability and improve overall welfare for both credit and supply shocks
(although to a di¤erent extent).48 Interestingly, following credit shocks, macroprudential regulation
minimizes the trade-o¤ between output and ination stabilization, or even between macro stability
and nancial stability when the nancial markets and real economy are intertwined. Credit spread-
augmented Taylor rules, on the other hand, are shown to be welfare detrimental, regardless if used
in conjunction with a countercyclical regulatory rule, and irrespective of the type of shock hitting
the economy.49 ;50 This nal policy implication supports the conventionalwisdom (Bernanke and
Gertler (2001)) and provides an alternative explanation to why monetary policy should not account
for nancial stability objectives in the Taylor rule; at least in a model where the borrowing cost
channel creates endogenous persistence in nancial variables, as well as a meaningful trade-o¤
between output and ination.
47 In Figure 5, we limit the ranges of  and 
C to (1; 5) and ( 30; 0) respectively. This enables us to illustrate the
complementarity between these two policy rules in a transparent way, without compromising our main conclusions.
48As opposed to Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014), we nd that countercyclical regulation is not only e¤ective
following nancial shocks but also in response to more standard supply shocks. Furthermore, with the nancial
regulator in this model being the central bank, and with a micro-founded welfare loss function, the coordination
problems between the two authorities (who may have di¤erent loss functions) are absent. In fact, in our model,
monetary policy and Basel III regulation are complementary to one another following supply shocks.
49We have also conrmed this result following policy (demand) shocks, which, similarly to nancial and supply
shocks, move output and ination in opposite directions. Under these shocks, an unexpected rise in the policy rate
leads to a fall in output (through an intertemporal substitution e¤ect) and to a rise in ination (via the monetary
policy cost channel), thereby giving rise to the price puzzle e¤ect observed in many empirical studies.
50Gelain, Lansing and Mendicino (2013) nd that nancially-augmented Taylor rules reduce volatility of key vari-
ables at the cost of increasing ination volatility. We support this initial result and further conclude that nancially
modied monetary policy rules provide zero welfare benets.
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5 Conclusion
We develop an important framework for identifying the interactions between the credit markets and
the real business cycle, as well as evaluating the macroprudential roles of bank capital regulation
and monetary policy in promoting nancial and macroeconomic stability. Key features of this
DSGE setup include nominal rigidities, endogenous credit frictions and a borrowing cost channel.
The policy lessons arising from our model imply that central banks should reduce their ina-
tion response in the Taylor rule in spite of higher inationary pressures, and in the presence of a
borrowing cost channel driven mainly by nancial frictions. However, following standard supply
shocks, introducing countercyclical regulation, as proposed by Basel III, allows central banks to
be more stringent on ination and control for price volatility via the standard demand channel of
monetary policy. For these shocks, an aggressive countercyclical regulatory response to credit risk
enables the policy maker to counter (but not eliminate) the standard e¤ects of supply shocks. For
credit shocks directly a¤ecting default risk and credit spreads, Basel III type rules can eliminate
macroeconomic gaps, the output-price ination-wage ination trade-o¤, and therefore the need
for conventional monetary policy rules. In this framework, the adverse procyclical spillover con-
sequences of the nancial shock are completely o¤set by an appropriate countercyclical response
to credit risk, which e¤ectively restores the equilibrium price of credit. These state contingent
results indicate the importance of identifying the source of economic disturbances for the design of
macroprudential regulation and monetary policy (in line with Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012)).
Finally, this paper captures the behavioral dynamics of nancial and real variables following eco-
nomic and nancial disturbances, as well as provides meaningful and non-trivial policy implications
when the borrowing cost channel and nancial frictions matter.
A key practical issue in the context of our paper and more generally in the macroprudential
literature is how macroprudential policies can be implemented without adversely a¤ecting the
credibility of central banks and regulatory authorities? The common tradition in central banks is
to target ination in an aggressive manner, but if nancial regulation can perform better in terms
of achieving price stability, how would this impact the anti-ination credibility of central banks?
Hence, these macroprudential tools must be calibrated jointly with a transparent communication
of the specic roles of central banks and the regulatory authorities, which in essence may achieve
the primary objectives of traditional monetary policy in periods of nancial distress.
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6 Appendix
6.1 The Simplied Loan Rate Equation in Steady State
To provide an analytical solution for the loan rate equation in steady state, we make two simplifying
assumptions: (a) A constant unit labour cost W=A; set equal to unity for convenience; (b) An
idiosyncratic IG rm risk distribution U(0; 2): Under these assumptions, rms default if "F < RL;
where  is the probability of recovering collateral in the default state. The greatest lower band
for the idiosyncratic shock at solvent rms is "F;M : Since the threshold depends on the loan rate,






 : Note however that with constant
unit labour cost, mc = RL = (pm) 1; where pm denotes the price mark-up. Hence, the probability
of default in steady state can be written as  = (pm)
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 ; which depends only on the structural









> 1 denoting the constant risk premium under the above assumptions.
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The following partial e¤ects are immediate:
 A higher deposit rate (RD) raises the loan rate.
 A higher cost of issuing bank capital c raises the loan rate.
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 A lower recovery rate () raises the loan rate.
 A higher capital ratio () has an ambiguous e¤ect on the cost of borrowing: as c is very low,
then the loan rate is decreasing in the capital ratio; for large enoughc it is increasing. As
mentioned in a footnote within the text, we nd that for c  0:0014 the loan rate is indeed
increasing with the regulatory ratio. The value of c chosen in our calibration puts the increase
in the weighted average cost of capital and the cost of credit following an increase in bank
capital into a reasonable empirical range, as well as xes the long run loan rate at a plausible
level.
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